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Development in the Central American coun-
tries in the past quarter-century has shown 
positive features, which are brought out by the 
author: an annual average rate of economic 
growth of more than 5%, a near-doubling of real 
income per capita, expansion and diversifica-
tion of exports, a surge forward in industriali-
zation, the extension and improvement of 
communications and social services, and so 
on. Nevertheless, long-standing problems 
have remained, and new ones have arisen: 
external dependence, a tendency towards ex-
ternal disequilibrium, uneven distribution of 
the benefits of economic growth, with its 
consequences of poverty, unemployment, 
underemployment and marginal status, grow-
ing difficulties encountered by the political 
systems in coping with the divergent pressures 
of a rapidly diversifying society, and inconsis-
tencies and conflicts between the public and 
private sectors. To this has been added, in 
recent years, the problems caused by the rise 
in the price of oil, inflation and growing exter-
nal indebtedness. 
After considering these aspects, the 
author rapidly reviews the development of the 
Central American Common Market and the 
economic and political obstacles which it has 
had to face in the past decade. He concludes 
with a few realistic and pragmatic ideas for 
revitalizing CACM. 





Last week I had the opportunity to discuss 
with Alan Riding his excellent statement 
delivered here during the first meeting of 
the Discussion Group on Central America. 
During our conversation, Alan asked me 
what kind of future I thought was in store for 
the Central American countries, and I must 
say that I was hard pressed to reply. The 
steady drift towards political polarization 
and the presence in three countries of terror-
ist groups and increased repression to com-
bat them raises serious doubt as to the 
viability of reasonably stable, free societies 
with at least a minimum amount of public 
participation in the conduct of public af-
fairs. As Alan correctly stated in his pre-
sentation, changes are occurring in practi-
cally all countries. There was a routine 
— and, by Latin American standards, un-
usual — change of command last week in 
Costa Rica, but it is hard to say what direc-
tion events in Guatemala and Nicaragua 
will take, nor what the ultimate conse-
quences of the deadlock in £1 Salvador 
will be, nor whether the Honduran grand 
strategy of a shift to "guided democracy" 
will be successful. To all these difficulties, 
furthermore, we must add serious doubts 
as to the economic viability of the Central 
American countries, at least taken indi-
vidually, and I would like to address my-
self to this general topic today. 
i 
Although I was originally asked to talk 
about "the current economic situation in 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nic-
aragua and Costa Rica, the current state 
of the Central American Common Market, 
and the prospects for both" this is a tall 
order for a statement of from 25 to 30 min-
utes, and I would therefore prefer to share 
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some thoughts with you on what the Central 
American economies have been doing over 
the long term. This will automatically lead 
me to the topic of "the Central American 
Common Market (CACM), and I will end 
with some reflections about the present 
and the future. For obvious reasons, I will 
not burden you with figures and statistics 
—these are readily available in numerous 
publications— and I will only allude to 
specific countries when general statements 
about Central America clearly do not apply 
to them. This over-simplification, of 
course, hides the fact that Central America 
is not an economic unit, and that even 
when certain trends in all five countries 
point in the same direction, they usually 
evolve at differing rates and with different 
characteristics. 
ii 
To begin, then, it can be said that the 
economic evolution of the five Central 
American countries since the end of World 
War II has been characterized by what we 
could describe as six dilemmas: (1) econ-
omic growth without economic justice; 
(2) expansion of production, but with in-
sufficiencies ; (3) increasing complexity 
of the countries' economies and societes 
without the corresponding political re-
forms; (4) growth and diversification of 
exports, but with continuing external vul-
nerability; (5) the deaf men's dialogue 
between the public and private sectors re-
garding their respective roles in promot-
ing economic development, and (6) the 
stimuli and constraints of economic 
integration in Central America. All of 
these so-called dilemmas share a common 
trait threading through them: the pitfalls 
of making absolute statements about what 
is happening in Central America, due pre-
cisely to the increasing complexity of the 
countries' economies and societies. Let us 
explore further. 
1. Economic growth without economic 
justice 
As a case in point of what I have just said, it 
would be just as wrong to state that the Cen-
tral American countries have experienced 
a dramatic process of economic develop-
ment in the past quarter-century as it would 
be to state —as is often done— that nothing 
has happened since 1950. In point of fact, 
all five countries have experienced sub-
stantial economic expansion since that time, 
with an average rate of growth of the GDP 
of 5.3% in real terms over the 27 year period 
(the most dynamic economies were Nicara-
gua and Costa Rica, the least dynamic, 
Honduras). Even taking account of the 
high rate of population growth, per capita 
real income almost doubled during this 
period, which is an impressive long-run 
performance for countries that are not 
particularly well endowed with natural 
resources. 
Even in the 1970s, a period in which the 
region confronted particularly severe prob-
lems —the increase in oil prices, the tur-
bulence in international monetary and 
financial markets, the food and raw material 
shortages of 1974/1975, several droughts 
and, to boot, three major natural disasters 
(in Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatema-
la)— the average rate of growth exceeded 
5.6% in real terms. 
This period of expansion of the produc-
tive capacity of the five countries was 
accompanied by changes. There was a 
notable shift towards urbanization, the 
supply of certain basic services improved, 
communications were greatly developed, 
and the relative shares of secondary and 
tertiary activities increased in importance 
vis-a-vis primary activities. However, one 
of the crucial questions that must be raised 
is whether the benefits of growth and change 
in Central America have had a lasting effect 
on the majority of the region's inhabitants. 
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There are two alternative extreme sce-
narios in reply to this question. On the one 
hand, some persons would argue that there 
has indeed been a "trickle-down" effect, 
and in support of their position they point to 
the growing "middle class", especially in 
urban centres; to declining rates of illitera-
cy and mortality — especially infant mor-
tality — and to rising life expectancy at 
birth; to the vastly improved communica-
tions and telecommunications networks in 
each country and, in general, to the process 
of "modernization"; and to the impres-
sive increase in the consumption of non-dur-
able consumer goods. On the other hand, 
others argue that for the majority of the 
population there has been no perceptible 
change in the standard of living during the 
past quater-century. The defenders of this 
latter thesis argue that the Central Ameri-
can countries' model of development tends 
to concentrate income in the hands of a very 
few; that while it may be true that some socio-
economic indicators show improvement, it 
is equally true that in absolute terms, for 
example, there are many more illiterates 
today than there were twenty years ago; that 
the expansion of physical infrastructure 
has only benefited a minority, and that the 
real income of the "poorest of the poor" 
may very well have declined due to the com-
bined effects of the land tenure system and 
inflation. 
Probably the truth lies somewhere in 
between these two extreme positions, but 
one fact is undeniable: economic growth in 
Central America has by no means benefited 
all groups in the same manner, and a signif-
icant segment of the population —possibly 
over 50%— lives in what would be described 
as extreme poverty by any reasonable 
criteria. 
The highly inequitable income distri-
bution in most of the countries —Costa 
Rica's situation is less acute than that in the 
others, but only relatively so— makes for 
some striking contrasts, since the upper 
and middle income groups emulate the 
consumption patterns of more developed 
societies, especially the United States. It is 
therefore common, mostly in the capital 
cities, to see the most wretched slums located 
within blocks of spanking new shopping 
centres, stocked with the most exotic of con-
sumer goods, and with parking lots over-
flowing with late-model Mercedes Benz and 
other luxury automobiles. 
2. Expansion of production, but with 
insufficiencies 
This brings us to the second dilemma. May-
be there is something to be said for Raúl Pre-
bisch's theory about the "dynamic insuf-
ficiency" of most Latin American coun-
tries. As already noted, 27 years of impres-
sive economic growth have brought scarcely 
any improvement in the material welfare of 
a significant proportion of Central Ameri-
ca's population, and the economies have 
not grown at a rapid enough rate even to 
begin to offer full employment. On the 
average, open unemployment is anything 
between 8 and 15% of the economically ac-
tive population, while it is estimated that 
underemployment probably ranges be-
tween 40 and 50%. 
Possibly the demographic panorama is 
partly to blame for this situation. The 
Central American countries have some of 
the highest population growth rates in the 
world and, except for Costa Rica, there has 
been no clear decline in these rates during 
the past quarter-century. Thus, the region's 
population grew from 8.3 million inhab-
itants in 1950 to 19 million at the end of 
1977, and it is estimated that it will reach 39 
million by the year 2000. In addition, it is 
by and large a young population, with a 
high ratio of dependency on the economi-
cally active population. 
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But there is another aspect to the so-
called insufficiencies. Like the boy who 
cried "wolf" once too often, economists 
have periodically predicted that the re-
gion's capacity for growth was exhausted, 
and that only profound transformations in 
the economic structure could get the engine 
of growth moving again. After all, how much 
more coffee, cotton, and bananas can the 
world consume? So far, these apocalyptic 
predictions have not been borne out and in 
the long run the countries have managed a 
fairly respectable performance as far as 
growth is concerned. However, two things 
can be said. In the first place, this economic 
expansion has obviously been uneven, and 
all countries have experienced periodical 
profound recessions, mostly coinciding 
with cyclical fluctuations in the prices of 
the basic commodities they export (or, in 
some instances, with crop failures). In the 
second place, during the past few years 
there have been some disturbing signs that 
the prophets of doom may yet have their day, 
and these signs have not been read clearly 
only because the extraordinarily high 
prices of coffee provoked a short-lived boom 
in 1976 and 1977. The industrialization rate 
has remained stagnant during the past 
seven years, after spectacular growth in 
the early 1960s, and imports of agricul-
tural commodities —especially basic food-
stuffs— have been increasing dramatically. 
More important, prospects on the interna-
tional markets for most of the commodities 
the region exports are not good. With all 
these adverse signs, can the Central Ameri-
can countries maintain their past economic 
growth performance in the future? Only 
time will tell. 
3. Increasing complexity of the countries' 
economies and societies without the 
corresponding political reforms 
The process of growth and change described 
above has brought about increasing com-
plexity of the countries' societies and the 
establishment of new forms of organization. 
For example, the industrial development 
and urbanization stimulated by the Central 
American Common Market has created a 
small urban proletariat, while the increasing 
diversification of the agricultural sector 
—for example, the emergence of sugar as an 
important export crop— has also led to 
the strengthening of rural trade unions. At 
the same time, the agricultural co-opera-
tive movement has experienced an impor-
tant expansion in some countries. The rela-
tively new phenomenon (for Central Ameri-
ca) of significant inflationary pressures in 
the 1970s certainly helped to make these 
movements more vociferous in their de-
mands. Their emergence as new pressure 
groups over the past quarter-century has 
been viewed with mixed emotions by the 
so-called "establishment" or dominant 
groups of society. The labour movement 
has generally been regarded with great ap-
prehension and has frequently been re-
sisted, sometimes with extreme repressive 
measures. In other instances, efforts have 
been made to co-opt the union leadership 
in order to ensure a "tame" labour move-
ment. Somewhat similar reactions have 
been observed vis-a-vis the co-operative 
movement, especially in the rural areas. 
However, in spite of the efforts to sup-
press or at any rate control the emergence 
and growth of popular movements, and in 
spite of the hostile attitude that exists in at 
least three countries to any such develop-
ments, the dynamics of economic growth 
and the increasing complexity of the econ-
omies and societies —aided, as 1 have 
stated by inflation— have spawned 
numerous such movements. Is the pol-
itical structure, still geared to the tra-
ditional power groups, ready to adapt to 
this new and potentially explosive devel-
opment? Is further repression in store and, 
if so, will it be able to reverse the trend? Will 
these new pressure groups alter the power 
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structure in the long run? It is too early to 
tell, but those who argue that nothing has 
changed in Central America in the past 
25 years would be well advised to examine 
the implications of the co-operative 
movement in Guatemala, the labour move-
ment in Honduras, and the peasant/ 
Catholic-action movement in El Salvador 
before coming in with their final verdicts. 
4. Growth and diversification of exports, 
but with continuing external 
vulnerability 
Economic growth in Central America has 
traditionally been a function of exports, 
aided, since the early 1960s, by industrial 
development resulting from the establish-
ment of the Central American Common 
Market. 
The days of monoculture in Central 
America —one of the prime characteristics 
of the region for centuries— are now more 
or less over, since in no country does the 
single most important export commodity 
account for more than 50% of exports (as 
against 80% to 90% in 1950), nor does any 
single import market absorb more than 50% 
of that product. The diversification and 
expansion of total exports is reflected elo-
quently in the figures: the value of exports 
increased from 325 million dollars in 1950 
to 500 million in 1960, 1.3 billion in 1970, 
and 4.7 billion in 1977. This last figure is 
admittedly somewhat inflated due to the 
price of coffee prevailing at the time, but 
this more than fourteen-fold increase in 
the value of exports over a 27 year period 
is nevertheless impressive. 
At the same time, considerable progress 
was made in import substitution, especially 
of manufactured consumer goods, as the 
integration process gave this sector a pow-
erful boost. The relative share of industry 
in the GDP rose from 12.9% in 1960 to 
15.6% in 1970, while the relative share of 
consumer goods in the make-up of total 
imports declined. However —and here is 
my main point— in absolute terms imports 
of consumer goods continued to grow, 
while imports of intermediate and capital 
goods took the place of consumer goods 
as the main import commodities. In total, 
imports grew even quicker than exports, 
and in spite of diversification and growth 
of exports the region's balance-of-payments 
gap was not closed but on the contrary, 
grew. As a matter of fact, with the above-
described growth and diversification, the 
region's dependence on imports increased 
markedly: in 1950, imports accounted for 
15% of the GDP, a proportion which in-
creased to around 20% in 1960 and re-
mained there throughout the 1960s, but 
then gradually increased again in the 
1970s until it reached the astounding level 
of 32% in 1977, due, in part, to the region's 
extreme dependence on imported oil. 
The almost constant growth of the cur-
rent account deficit has been financed by 
increasing capital inflows, consisting of 
both direct foreign investment and public 
and private borrowing. The book value of 
foreign investments in the region approxi-
mately doubled between 1960 and 1970, and 
doubled again between 1970 and 1976, to 
surpass the billion dollar mark. This gives 
rise to all the well-known polemics about 
the relative positive and adverse effects of 
the transnational corporations operating in 
the region. The public external debt has 
also risen markedly, although it is still within 
prudent limits, at least for three of the re-
gion's countries. The balance of the pub-
lic external debt rose from practically 
zero in 1950 to almost 2.5 billion dollars at 
the end of 1977, and this trend will no doubt 
continue, raising the spectre of eventual 
debt-capacity problems. 
In sum, in spite of impressive accom-
plishments on the export side and in imports 
substitution, Central America's external 
sector is more vulnerable today than ever, 
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due to its extreme dependence on: (1) ex-
port markets; (2) imports, especially of 
strategic items such as raw materials, 
petroleum, and capital goods, and (3) 
ever-increasing net capital inflows. 
5. The deaf men's dialogue between 
the public and private sectors regarding 
their respective roles in promoting 
economic development 
The direct involvement of the public sec-
tor in the Central American economies is 
very modest, and has only grown somewhat 
in the past few years. Public expenditure 
only represented between 13 and 14% of the 
GDP between 1950 and 1970, while in 1977 
it has increased to 16.8%, partly on account 
of the abnormally high capital cost of re-
construction in Guatemala and Nicaragua. 
In addition to this very low ratio of 
public expenditure, the public sector is 
rarely involved in productive activities, and 
it was only during the 1960s that it took over 
most utilities. 
The private sector, for its part, seems to 
have been nurtured by cold-war ideology, 
and it has never quite outgrown the con-
sequences. Representative entrepreneurial 
groups, organized in Chambers of Com-
merce, Industry and Agriculture, defend 
the principles of free enterprise with re-
ligious fervour, extoll the virtues of cap-
italism, and rail against State interven-
tion. The public sector, for its part, does not 
act as a monolithic unit. However, certain 
groups within this sector, which could be 
characterized as a Central American 
technocracy, have managed to influence 
governments to the point where they take 
a more reformist stance. As a conse-
quence, there has been a deaf men's 
dialogue in the region —more intensive 
in some countries than others— on the 
relative merits and shortcomings of 
"intervencionismo" (which, in the eyes of 
some, is just a hair's breadth from com-
munism) and "liberalismo". In the 
shouting, what is generally not perceived 
is that neither the public nor the private 
sectors do a reasonably efficient job in 
fulfilling roles that each implicity 
assumes for itself. The rate of capital for-
mation in the region, for example — both 
public and private —, has been slow. The 
ratio of private investment to GDP barely 
changed between 1950 and 1970, and it has 
only increased slightly in the past few years, 
probably as a result of the vast accumula-
tion of surpluses in the export sector. Thus, 
the ratio of total capital formation to GDP 
grew from 13.5% in 1950 to 15.1% in 1970 
and 19.5% in 1977: still very low even for 
developing countries. 
Furthermore, the private sector has a 
marked proclivity to invest in high-yield, 
short-risk ventures, especially real estate 
and commerce, which are not precisely the 
highest-priority areas for economic devel-
opment. Nor are the economic agents quick 
to respond to the signals of the market 
economy, due to the natural imperfections 
of the functioning of capitalism in its 
underdeveloped form (what the Economic 
Commission for Latin America calls "ca-
pitalismo periférico"). Enterprises are 
usually organized at the family level, and 
efficiency is undoubtedly low. 
As for the public sector, when it does get 
involved in nudging the economy along the 
path of some pre-conceived "strategy", 
it more often than not makes a mess of it. The 
frequent accusations of the private sector 
that the State is a "poor administrator" 
are unfortunately borne out with unbeliev-
able persistency. The performance of pub-
lic utilities is sometimes adequate, but 
usually sub-standard; the delivery of public 
services such as education and health is 
usually poor, and many State-run institu-
tions such as port authorities, development 
banks, airlines and national lotteries seem 
to have a special bent for losing money. 
In short, "messiness", by certain 
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standards, seems to be a characteristic of the 
Central American societies and neither 
the public nor the private sector perform 
very efficiently in making important con-
tributions to the development process. 
Possibly if the deaf men's dialogue were 
replaced by a more constructive one, this 
general state of affairs could be gradually 
overcome. 
6. The stimuli andconstraints of 
economic integration in Central America 
I would like to extend myself a bit on this 
topic —which is close to my heart and may 
be of more than passing interest to you— 
so I will take it up again later. For now, 
I will limit myself to pointing out that the 
formation of the Central American Com-
mon Market gave industrial growth a very 
powerful stimulus during most of the 
1960s, but that somewhere between 1967 
and 1969 it apparently touched its ceiling. 
The process still exhibits great vitality, 
measured in terms of intra-regional trade 
and the survival of the CACM even after an 
armed conflict between two of its member 
States. Nevertheless, the question of how 
to continue the very dynamic progress ob-
served, say, between 1960 and 1967 poses 
the sixth dilemma that I referred to. 
in 
At present, Central America seems to be 
marking time once again, at a quantitative 
and qualitative level very different from 
that of 1950, but with a number of constant 
problems —balance of payments, unem-
ployment, low capital formation, extreme 
inequalities in income distribution— which 
have all continued to be present throughout 
this long period. As we have seen, the re-
gion now contains relatively stronger, more 
complex societies, whose economic impor-
tance, at least within the Latin American 
context, should by no means be minimized 
(after all, total imports of this small region 
are not very much lower than Mexico's). 
The many problems that are implicit in what 
I have said so far have been joined in the 
present decade by at least three new poten-
tial obstacles to development which were 
either not present or not of significant 
importance previously. These are: (1) the 
region's high dependence on imported fuel; 
(2) the new problem of inflation, and 
(3) potential debt burden problems. Just 
a few words on each of these topics. 
Unfortunately for Central America, the 
low price and abundance of petroleum be-
fore 1972 meant that, a very significant part 
of the region's generating capacity is based 
on thermal power. Thus, the bill for im-
ported petroleum, which was only 60 
million dollars in 1970, rose to 430 million 
dollars in 1977. The only commercial find 
of petroleum in Central America has been 
in Guatemala, and it is too early to tell just 
how important this find is. The consider-
able hydroelectric potential of the region 
will therefore have to be developed, but 
the capital costs that this involves are 
staggering, and will no doubt skim away 
resources from other high-priority re-
quirements. This poses at least another 
"mini-dilemma" for the countries of 
the region. 
Inflation is a problem the countries are 
barely beginning to learn to cope with. 
Price stability was exemplary in the post-
war period; between €§50 and 1970, the 
average price index only rose about 13% in 
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20 years. Between 1970 and 1977, however, 
the average price index increased 74%. 
Given the relative weakness of labour unions 
—in spite of their growing strength— and 
the dynamics of economic growth in Cen-
tral America and almost everywhere else, 
the first important impact of inflation will 
no doubt be to aggravate the already inequi-
table structure of income. How to avoid 
this is an additional "mini-dilemma". 
Finally, the increased foreign debt of 
I would now like to return to the topic of the 
Central American Common Market. As 
most of you know, in the early and mid 1960s 
it was viewed both by Central Americans and 
by the international community as a highly 
successful programme of economic inte-
gration between developing countries; part 
of this success was reflected in the consi-
derable increase in intra-regional trade, 
which passed from 32 million dollars in 
1960 to 260 million in 1968. This spectacu-
lar growth in trade is a further reflection of 
the rapid expansion of productive capacity 
in the manufacturing sector, spurred on by 
the expanded regional market and by delib-
erate industrial development policies, 
including, of course, a uniform protective 
tariff. In the short span of five years an 
almost perfect common market was estab-
lished and the institutional framework to 
promote integration was consolidated. 
There was further progress in aspects es-
sential to free trade, such as the establish-
ment of the Central American Clearing 
House to expedite the payment of intra-
regional transactions and the construction 
of a regional highway network on which 
goods could be transported rapidly and at 
reasonable cost. In addition, there was an 
most Central American countries comes at 
a time when access to international capital 
markets, and especially access to conces-
sionary funds, is becoming increasingly 
difficult for so-called "middle-class coun-
tries". Therefore, the final "mini-dilem-
ma" I want to raise is how the Central 
American countries are going to continue 
to finance the level of imports required 
to maintain an acceptable level of growth. 
aura of good will —even a kind of mys-
tique— in the negotiations between govern-
ments on regional affairs, and a most 
important feature was that economic in-
tegration was successfully separated from 
political issues (hence the presence of the 
Ministers of Economy instead of the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the inter-
governmental bodies that took decisions at 
the regional level). 
However, once the initial decisive mea-
sures had been taken, the process failed 
to expand in scope and in level: in other 
words, once the common market was formed 
and consolidated, the feeble efforts to sub-
ject an ever-widening number of economic 
activities to regional approaches did not 
produce significant results, nor were the 
governments willing to entrust greater 
executive responsibilities to the regional 
institutions. 
Those of us schooled in neo-functional-
ist thinking were conditioned to look for-
ward to the proverbial "spill-over effects" 
and the gradual evolution of the integration 
process along its pre-conceived path. When 
this did not happen, we began to suspect that 
something was amiss, and soon the word 
"crisis" crept into the lexicon of Central 
IV 
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American integration. To be sure, the pro-
cess had serious problems: the unequal 
distribution of costs and benefits among 
member countries, the natural conflicts 
between national development policies and 
regional objectives, the very limited body 
of supporters that existed in the region in 
favour of integration, and the difficulties 
that retarded dec is ion-making at the re-
gional level. However, these problems 
could —and can— be coped with, and in 
fact it would be naive to think that econ-
omic integration between countries can 
evolve without this type of obstacles. The 
only real "crisis" afoot was one of expec-
tations, since the process was not evolving 
as anticipated, but evolving it was, and in 
a quite satisfactory manner. Without deny-
ing that the process confronted obstacles 
by 1967-1968, I feel that the magnitude 
of them was often exaggerated and that 
somehow we had lost sight of the consider-
able degree of economic interdependence 
that had already been achieved at that 
time, in spite of those obstacles. 
Then in 1969 a very significant event 
took place: for reasons we need not discuss 
here, an armed conflict broke out between 
two of the member countries of the CACM, 
with two major consequences. In the first 
place, and as a testimony to the degree of 
economic interdependence already achiev-
ed, the Common Market survived, albeit 
with some mutations (trade between El 
Salvador and Honduras was suspended, and 
Honduras withdrew from some of the inter-
governmental regional organs). In the 
second place, the relative isolation of econ-
omic integration from political phenomena 
had ended; from now on, economic and 
political considerations would be indis-
solubly interrelated. 
Since 1969, two major opposing tend-
encies have been at work. On the hand, 
the negative factors present before 1969 
have continued manifesting themselves, 
together with some additional problems 
that we need not go into now, thus giving the 
impression of a certain impasse in the in-
tegration process. On the other hand, 
notwithstanding the disturbance of its nor-
mal functioning the Common Market has 
shown a measure of vitality that is often ig-
nored, especially outside of Central Amer-
ica. Intra-regionat trade continues to 
expand every year and it has more than dou-
bled in value in the present decade, moving 
from 300 million dollars in 1970 to over 700 
million dollars in 1977: a respectable sum 
in anybody's book, and equivalent to almost 
20% of the region's total foreign trade. Most 
of the regional institutions continue to 
operate with a semblance of normality, and 
with the participation of all five countries. 
The Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration has increased its level of lending 
activities year after year, and both El Sal-
vador and Honduras signed an agreement 
to further monetary integration in Central 
America only weeks after the armed conflict. 
These two countervailing forces — impasse 
and vitality — have created certain tensions 
that could be productively exploited to 
provoke a new impetus in the integration 
process, but this possibility has so far come 
up against an insurmountable political 
barrier: the still unresolved conflict be-
tween El Salvador and Honduras. 
Hence my statement about the interre-
lations between economic and political 
phenomena at the regional level. The first 
step required to resolve the tensions de-
scribed above and tilt the balance in favour 
of the dynamic aspects of integration is to 
resolve the differences between these two 
countries, and fortunately a mediation 
process is already underway which hope-
fully will culminate in the signing of a treaty 
that would, in effect, bury those differences. 
Once this considerable hurdle is cleared, 
the second step would be to seek solutions to 
the main problems that integration has 
faced, rejecting any pre-conceived theoret-
ical framework and approaching these prob-
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lems with a large measure of realism and 
pragmatism. For example, we should rec-
ognize that integration is a complement to 
national development policies and that not 
all activities have to be subjected to common 
treatment; that the process will not neces-
sarily culminate in the formation of an eco-
nomic unit, so that we should abandon com-
mitments that involve the fulfilling of 
time-tables or stages; and that the concep-
tual framework that might have been ade-
quate for the 1950s is not necessarily suita-
ble for tackling the different problems we 
face in the 1970s and in the future. The ac-
cent should be put on those areas of econ-
omic activity where integration makes sense, 
and where it becomes relevant to the 
national development effort of each 
country. I personally feel that much more 
emphasis should be placed on specific 
integration projects —in industry, energy 
and agriculture, for example— since these 
projects, in addittion to increasing the level 
of economic interdependence between 
To conclude, I should like to say a few 
words about the economic prospects of Cen-
tral America in order to come full-circle 
back to the original query as to the viability 
of these countries, or at least their economic 
viability. 
I am very reluctant to speak like an 
oracle, because every time I have done so 
in the past, when the future has looked 
very bleak, some unforeseen phenomenon 
—like a frost in Brazil .which provoked 
price increases in coffee, to the benefit of 
Central American producers— has come 
along to alter the picture. In addition, as 
pointed out previously, the Central Ameri-
can economies have shown a greater capacity 
for diversification, growth and accommoda-
tion to changing international economic 
countries, have an intrinsic value which is 
easily measurable for the participating 
countries. 
In sum, maybe the Central American 
Common Market is not alive and well, but it 
most certainly is alive, and we should be 
able to make it well. In fact, the integration 
process has shown remarkable vitality. I 
do not share the opinion held by some that 
the CACM is and will remain stagnant: on 
the contrary, the type of difficulties that 
each of the countries will face in its econ-
omic development up to, say, the end of 
this century, makes integration more rel-
evant than ever. In view of the efforts of 
the Governments of El Salvador and Hon-
duras to settle their differences, I feel that 
we may be about to turn the corner on this 
matter, and that it is not excessive optimism 
on my part to believe that the possibilities 
that economic integration offers to further 
development in the region have barely 
begun to be explored. 
conditions than one could normally expect. 
Having said all that, however, when one 
views the future one nevertheless cannot 
avoid harbouring serious doubts as to the 
prospects of small, "middle-income" un-
derdeveloped countries, whose economies 
are so dependent on the export of basic 
commodities. It is really difficult to imag-
ine how Central America can maintain 
the dynamism exhibited by its exports in 
the past 27 years, given world market 
conditions and the increasingly difficult 
access to external financing. It is also dif-
ficult to see how the persistent problems 
alluded to earlier can be overcome without 
a massive mobilization of resources. 
One thing can be categorically stated, 
however. The ability of the Central 
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American countries to navigate the rather 
turbulent waters of the international econ-
omy in the future, as well as their ability 
to cope with many of the domestic prob-
lems I have enumerated, would improve 
markedly if the economic integration pro-
cess were given new impetus. There is 
something to be said for the old proverb 
"in unity there is strength", and I feel 
that it is unnecessary to elaborate on the 
many ways in which a regional approach 
would improve the viability of the Central 
American economies. 
So, I finish my statement by really beg-
ging the issue, because I do not have an 
answer, but I do suggest that there is at least 
some hope for the economic future of these 
five small countries if they exploit the pos-
sibilities that common action holds out for 
them. 
